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**EUROPE ON THE CROSSROADS: POLICY
OF DEEPENING INTEGRATION
ON THE BACKGROUND OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CONTEXT AND POLITICS IN MEMBER STATES**

**EUROPA NA ROZDROŻU: POLITYKA POGŁĘBIANIA
INTEGRACJI NA TLE SPOŁECZNO-GOSPODARCZYM
I POLITYCZNYM PAŃSTW UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ**

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Summary: EU has presented five scenarios from which only one can be used as a guideline for the future path of European integration. None of the five scenarios has been selected as the one that will be followed in the future since the time they were shown to the public in March 2017. EU documents indicate that preferences are clear and “Europe plans to do more and together with all”. A similar situation is indicated by the context of closer cooperation between NATO and the EU. Nevertheless such a choice does not seem to get the uphold as far as the political situation in most of the EU states shows. The aim of this article is to present the conditions that will be used as a starting point for the formulation of three possible scenarios: most probable, pessimistic and optimistic.

Keywords: scenarios for the future EU integration, costs of future models of EU integration, internal market, EU-NATO cooperation, political integration of EU.

Streszczenie: UE w marcu 2017 przedstawiła pięć scenariuszy, szkicując opcje przyszłego rozwoju integracji i pokazując koszty oraz zakres przyszłego modelu współpracy między państwami członkowskimi UE. W artykule dowodzi się, że polityczna integracja może być osiągnięta po zakończeniu procesu integracji gospodarczej, chociaż kilka ruchów w kierunku integracji politycznej można wykonać równoległe, tak jak to miało miejsce dotąd, i można spodziewać się kontynuacji tego trendu w przyszłości. W artykule wskazano, że wzajemne relacje między UE i NATO mają wpływ na przyszły kształt integracji UE, co oznacza, że ważna rola w tym procesie przypisywana jest Wielkiej Brytanii i USA. Przedstawia się tu kilka elementów podobnych w dzisiejszym etapie integracji do jej początków zainicjowanych Planem Plevelna. W podsumowaniu przedstawia się trzy scenariusze dla przyszłej integracji UE, z których jeden jest optymistyczny, drugi pesymistyczny, trzeci realistyczny. Każdy z podanych scenariuszy ma wpływ na koszty integracji i związane z nimi obciążenia przerzucone na barki państw członkowskich UE.

Słowa kluczowe: scenariusze przyszłej integracji UE, koszty modeli przyszłej integracji UE, rynek wewnętrzny, współpraca UE-NATO, polityczna integracja UE.

1. The EU's plans

What are the EU plans? First, we have in the background several important things happening. Not even trying to describe all of them, I will just mention the most important events which enforce certain decisions. The first one is Brexit, which on the one hand, will have a strong impact on the vision of weight of European integration in all economies of the member states, while on the other hand it will change strongly the determinants of the EU Multiannual Financial Framework after 2020 and the EU's annual budget in general. Brexit when concluded will give limited time-space for proper negotiations of the EU's finances. The second condition is ascribed to EMU crisis which was not completely cured after the epidemic disease spread over several economies. This mainly concerns Greece, Spain, Portugal but also Italy and Ireland. The third one can be ascribed to relatively limited competitiveness of the EU's members markets. The fourth one covers a problem of an unfinished process of the creation of the internal market. The fifth, points at political problems in a number of EU member states. It is enough to mention here a long period of forming a government in Germany, a strong division in politics in France, tensions in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, which are resulted by different causes in each case.

Europe declares that the preferential plan is to do more with all but at the same time it tries to jump into the more advanced stages of integration, showing the desired path, what is followed by the demonstration of certain dose of impatience, what can be translated into following phrase: "we won't wait for the undecided forever", if they want to have "several speed Europe – let them have it that way, we waited already too long for them to join". This move is evidenced by launching a banking union for those in EMU and talking about further deepening moves, including political or military integration. The concept of the banking union was presented in the European's Commission Road Map in 2012 [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. A Roadmap...], where it was shown what the states needed to do if they wanted to adjust. The planned moves were the following: (1) Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)¹, (2) Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), (3) European Deposit Supervisory Scheme (EDIS) [Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Towards...] in a fully fledged stage of the implementation of the Banking Union. It should be reminded that the states who joined the EU in

¹ SSM and SRM were introduced in 2012.

2004 (and after) are all members of the EMU although those who still use national currencies are “members in derogation”. This means that they do not have an “opt out” condition in their membership agreement. “Ins” embrace: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Greece joined in the 3d stage of EMU creation as it had not been selected for the first phase because of difficulties in fulfilling the convergence criteria. From the new enlargement 2004+ the following states have joined: Slovenia (2007), Cyprus and Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Lithuania (2014). UK has an option of staying out the EMU (now in the light of Brexit this does not have any deeper meaning), Denmark’s Danish Crone is in ERM2, Sweden represents the view that the participation in ERM2 is an option for a state and not an obligation. Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania are outside EMU. Some of them declare the date of joining EMU, while others say that they plan to join but they do not give any dates which would show if they really plan such a step. Croatia and Bulgaria followed by Romania belong to the three plan to join. Also there is a certain rumor that Hungary is close to make such a move.

It should be clear that the completion of the internal market will change the conditions of service supplies in the market. Services cover in a wide definition also the banking market as part of the capital market. Staying out in such conditions eliminates a country by its own decision to be part of a market which will decide about the competitiveness of the whole market, its sophistication and effectiveness. Moreover, the core of EU, which means EMU, refers to further political and defense integration (this means PESCO [Permanent Structured Cooperation...] and European Intervention Initiative – a France proposal [<http://www.elysee.fr/assets/Initiative...>]). Poland declares the participation in PESCO [In defense of Europe...].

At this point we can ask several questions: can political and defense integration be achieved without concluding the stage of economic integration? We know that some steps in that direction have already been made but how far this can go without achieving in full those goals in economic integration which were already defined nearly 20 years ago (EMU was designed in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, that is 26 years ago) or even longer than that – 30 years ago (like SEA 1987-2018, 31 years ago). Comparisons are made with two approaches to EMU, first in P. Werners’ Plan in 1970 [Council – Commission of the European Communities. Report...] and second in 1992. In general people doubted that EMU would be launched but it was and it has been in operation for more than a quarter of a century (26 years). Political and defense integration was planned within the Pleven’s Plan of 1952. From the three Pleven’s proposals of Political Community, Defense Community and Coal and Steel Community – only one was put into force. That part was calling EC&SC into life. Now, 66 years later, Europe is undergoing political integration again, at least in case of some, selected activities.

Political integration is a very touchy and sensitive issue as it is linked with specific costs, and, moreover, it pushes the member states to delegate more sovereign

rights to the international level. In case of the economic sphere such a move does not awaken such big emotions as it does in the area of politics. In case of politics this delegation is more visible than in the sphere of economics.

2. The five scenarios

2.1. The White Paper on the Future of Europe.

Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2025 [White Paper on the Future... 2017] which were presented by Jean-Claude Juncker on 1 March 2017 included five scenarios to choose as a future model of an integration for Europe. Twelve months later we can say that no specific scenario was selected. More about the future of Europe may be known with a closer shape of “the Brexit deal” and the start of the negotiations of Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) after 2020.

The first scenario assumes that the EU-27 will carry on what has been done until now. In practice this means that the EU will focus on its policies of creating jobs, stimulating development, growth and investment. Effort will be made in strengthening each single market, accelerating capital engagement in digital economy, transport and logistics, energy and infrastructure.

The second scenario concentrates only on the single market. Picking up this path will draw all attention on accomplishing the single internal market of the EU, namely bringing up the unfinished process in creating internal market in services. The document says: “single market becomes the main *raison d'être*. Integration progress and coordination of policies – both depend on the ability to agree on togetherness, policies and common standards. Difficulty in approving further closer ties among the member states is reduced to four liberties, which concern free movement of goods, capital, people and services. In this scenario the EU still uses one tariff within common trade policy.

Within the third scenario those who want more, do more. This scenario does not force anyone to participate in doing more and each country who wants to do less is given a chance to do less. In reality, such a pattern has applied in the European Community until now, only the so called new member states, which joined the EU in 2004 and after are obliged by their accession treaties to participate in the process of deepening the integration. This condition seems to be difficult to be met by some states especially in the area of common currency (EMU). Practically, this scenario means that a group of states which take decisions on cooperation in security, defense, political integration, energy, R&D, procurement, etc. which is enabled by introduced legal and institutional arrangements – can do so. They can also establish own common missions abroad. Such a solution can lead to the establishment of a core group, surrounded by a group of followers.

The fourth scenario relies on efficiency which means that member states do less but more efficiently. This scenario enables all to catch-up within the areas where

they are delayed. In a way this scenario can be seen as a model of adjusting to current challenges created by competition, innovativeness and structural reforms of the markets. In this framework the EU members are able to work together on innovation policies, migration, control of the borders, security, etc. Cooperation can also embrace such important matters as making the economy greener, environment, decarbonization of the economy, digitalization, etc.

Table 1. Impact of the five scenarios on specific areas of policy, including the EU budget

Specific policies and their changes in the five scenarios					
Single market & trade	EMU	Schengen, migration & security	Foreign policy & defense	EU budget	Ability to act
1	2	3	4	5	6
First scenario: focused on continuation					
Single market is strengthened, including in energy and digital sectors; the EU-27 pursues progressive trade agreements	Incremental progress on improving the functioning of the euro area	Cooperation in the management of external borders stepped up gradually; progress towards a common asylum system; improved coordination on security matters	Progress is made on speaking with one voice on foreign affairs; closer defense cooperation	Partly modernized to reflect the reform agenda agreed by EU-27 states	Positive agenda for action yields concrete results; decision making remains complex to grasp; capacity to deliver does not always match expectations
Second scenario limiting integration to “internal market”					
Single market goods and capital strengthened; standards continue to differ; free movement of people and services not fully guaranteed	Cooperation in the euro area is limited	No single migration or asylum policy; further coordination on security dealt with bilaterally; internal border controls are more systematic	Some foreign policy issues are increasingly dealt with bilaterally; defense cooperation remains as it is today	Refocused to finance essential functions needed for the single market	Decision-making may be easier to understand but capacity to act collectively is limited; issues of common concern often need to be solved bilaterally

1	2	3	4	5	6
Third scenario letting those who want to do more – do more					
As in “Carrying on” single market is strengthened and the EU-27 pursue progressive trade agreements	As in “Carrying on” except for a group of countries who deepen cooperation on security and justice matters	As in “Carrying on” except for a group who deepen cooperation on security and justice matters	As in “Carrying on” except for a group of countries who deepen cooperation on defense, focusing on military cooperation and joint equipment	As in “Carrying on” additional budgets are made available by some Member States for the areas where they decide to do more	As in “Carrying on”, a positive agenda for action in EU-27 yields results; some groups achieve more together in certain domains; decision-making becomes more complex
Fourth scenario meaning that EU will do less but at the same time more effectively					
Common standards set to a minimum but enforcement is strengthened in areas regulated at EU level; trade exclusively dealt with at EU level	Several steps are taken to consolidate the euro area and ensure its stability; the EU-27 does less in some parts of employment and social policy	Cooperation on border management, asylum policies and counter-terrorism are systematic	The EU speaks with one voice on all foreign policy issues; a European Defense Union is created	Significantly redesigned to fit the new priorities agreed at the level of the EU-27	Initial agreement on tasks to prioritize or give up is challenging; once in place, decision making may be easier to understand; the EU acts quicker and more decisively where it has a greater role
Fifth scenario meaning that EU-27 will work together & and do much more					
Single market strengthened through harmonization of standards and stronger enforcement; trade exclusively dealt with at EU level	Economic, financial and fiscal Union is achieved as envisioned in the report of Five Presidents of June 2015	As in “Doing less more efficiently”, cooperation on border management, asylum policies and counterterrorism matters is systematic	As in “Doing less more efficiently”, the EU speaks with one voice on the foreign policy issues; a European Defense Union is created	Significantly modernized and increased, backed by own resources; a euro area fiscal stabilization function is operational	Decision-making is faster and enforcement is stronger across the board; questions of accountability arise for some who feel that the EU has taken too much power away from the Member States

Source: [White Paper on the Future... 2017, pp. 17-25].

The last, fifth scenario, can be seen as the most ambitious one. According to it member states can do together much more. This implies that on top of the economic achievements of integration – the EU can also add political integration. Such a decision would also change the role of the European Parliament, followed by common foreign and defense policies, meaning one military budget, one army, one representation abroad, in other states and international organizations. This also means the ratification of common trade deals by the European Parliament on the liberalization of goods, capital transfers and all FTA arrangements on the EU level.

From this table we can choose the activities which seem to be needed and desired in the future scenario in the context of dynamically changing environment in which the EU operates. This environment includes such occurrences as: growing tensions in relations with Russia (growing threat), building-up of the military power in China, which has been fuelled by the decades of accelerated GDP growth, political tensions in some NATO member states, followed by the dismantling of democratic institutions and laws which were introduced to guarantee their smooth functioning, political tensions and the process of withdrawal from democratic solutions in some EU member states, Brexit and the need to rethink deeply the model of financing of the EU, difficulties in the number of EU states to achieve consensus on forming government (Spain, Germany, Italy), the EMU crisis, the wave of refugees entering the EU territory and challenge for the organization to react to this, the policy of the USA leading to certain degradation of the strong position of the world leader in politics, protectionists and nationalistic moods in the number of states which were engaged in liberalization in the past, China as one of the main supporter of liberalization.

On the one hand we can see that all the mentioned new occurrences and some which had smaller weight and impact on countries' decisions in the past but in current conditions gained importance – show that there is no climate for the fifth scenario, which means that “EU-27 will work together and do more”. On the other hand, it becomes clear that the EU-27 is challenged with a number of problems which need decisions and relatively quick and effective action. This points at the need of relatively flexible solutions in the European integration model.

Trying to be objective, it needs to be shown that there are also some moves and events both of internal and external character that push the EU-27 towards closer cooperation in some areas [Anagnostopoulou, Papadopoulos, Papadopoulou 2016]. Trying to enumerate the most important ones at least such needs have to be mentioned: common decisions on future EU budget after Brexit, common reaction to refugee crisis as this problem cannot be solved by a group of EU members, because such an approach will challenge the single market, common reaction to the problem of defense, which on the one hand requires the increase of spending, while on the other the lack of closer integration blows-up the military expenditures in each country which creates a complicated background for bringing effective solutions being additionally confronted by the growing number of threats.

3. Agreement with NATO

EU (28²) and NATO (29³) have 22 member countries in common. This brings the cooperation of two organizations closer together which is additionally strengthened by several specific features. NATO is not equipped by infrastructural capacities, which are owned by its member states. The EU does not have military and defense financial allocations. It means that any action in the area of defense requires additional decisions and has to be decided univocally by all member states. Such solutions, in the light of a growing number of common members, create certain independency between the two structures. Until recently the US was seen as Mars and the EU was compared to Venus on the international scene [Kagan 2002]. Such comparisons were made as the USA was engaged in military missions while the EU and its members were usually in building peace and new order supportive for development and bringing basic stability after a military mission. Such a division of roles internationally created specific perception of the two: the USA – a strong military actor, the EU – an actor consisting of a number of states, including several former powers such as the UK, France, Spain, Portugal and Germany, but militarily weaker than the USA and strongly engaged in aid activities.

Table 2. Stages of institutionalized cooperation between EU and NATO (selected main steps)

Year	Decisions on cooperation
1	2
1992	EU adopts Maastricht Treaty, which envisages intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the eventual framing of a common defense policy (ESDP) with the WEU as the EU's defense component. Close cooperation is established between NATO and the WEU. Oslo, NATO foreign ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defense component of the EU that would also cover the "Petersberg tasks"
1994 (January)	Allies agree on availability of collective assets for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies within CFSP. NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, providing "separable but not separate" deployable headquarters for European-led operations, a conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries
1996 (June)	Berlin, NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis-management operations. These decisions lead to the introduction of the term „Berlin Plus“

² 28 EU member countries cover: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.

³ 29 NATO member countries: Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States.

Table 2, cont.

1	2
1998 (December)	St Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the EU's determination to establish European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
1999 (April)	Washington, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the "Berlin Plus" arrangements
1999 (December)	Helsinki Council meeting, EU MS establish military "headline goals" to allow the EU to deploy up to 60,000 troops by 2003 for 'Petersberg tasks'. EU members also create political and military structures including Political and Security Committee, Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis-management role of the WEU is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks
2000 (September)	The North Atlantic Council and the EU's interim Political and Security Committee meet for the first time to take stock of progress in NATO-EU relations
2000 (December)	Signature of the EU's Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003)
2002 (December)	EU-NATO declaration on ESDP
2004 (February)	France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid-reaction units composed of joint battle groups
2005 (October)	Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing NATO Permanent Liaison Team at the EU Military Staff and an EU cell at SHAPE
2006 (March)	EU cell set up at SHAPE
2014 (March)	NATO and EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors hold informal talks on Ukraine
2016 (February)	Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense was concluded between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency Response Team of the European Union (CERT-EU), providing a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams
2016 (February)	At the request of Germany, Greece and Turkey, NATO defense ministers agree that the Alliance should join international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and illegal migration in the Aegean Sea, cooperating with the European Union's border management agency, Frontex
2016 (June)	Warsaw, a joint declaration expresses the determination to give new impetus and new substance to the NATO-EU strategic partnership in light of common challenges. Areas for strengthened cooperation include: countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including the sea, cyber security and defiance, defense capabilities, defense industrial cooperation, exercises and building the defense capabilities of partners to the east and south
2017 (June)	The first progress report on NATO-EU cooperation – authored jointly by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representative / Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini – concludes that the two organizations are making substantial progress in complementing each other's work since the agreement in Warsaw in July 2016 to work more closely together in areas ranging from resilience to hybrid threats, through greater coherence on capability development to helping build the defense capacities of partner countries

Source: [<https://www.nato.int...>].

The table concentrates on the main moves, which means that there were more activities, which are not reflected in it. The milestones in the cooperation of EU-NATO embrace the so called "Berlin Plus" initiative of 2003, conclusions of the Lisbon summit (2010) when the improvement of EU-NATO strategic partnership was

decided and the 2010 strategic concept committed the Alliance to closer cooperation, which also included cooperation in remaining international organizations. The decisions made in this area were addressing activities preventing crises, managing conflicts and stabilizing the post-conflict situations. Next move can be ascribed to Warsaw Summit and the decisions undertaken within its framework. In Warsaw EU and NATO have defined areas in which they should strengthen cooperation in light of common challenges to the east and south, including countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defense capacity building, cyber defense, maritime security, and exercises. The list of decided activities covered over 40 measures to advance NATO-EU cooperation. Close cooperation between NATO and the EU is an important element in the development of an international “comprehensive approach” to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means.

Studying the stages of mutual cooperation between EU and NATO one can come to a simple conclusion of strong influence of this cooperation on the decisions which are undertaken within the EU on political and security matters covered by foreign policy area. Also such commitments can be seen within the conclusions which were approved on consecutive G-7 summits in the past. The list of problems which are solved commonly are linked with security but embrace also such issues as Schengen, Frontex, R&D cooperation, etc. More recently they also embrace such events as Brexit or alliances in the “steel war” caused by a decision to impose 25% tariffs on steel import and 10% tariffs on aluminum to the US. The USA allies are excluded from that protective move, which mainly hits Russia, China, Turkey and some minor suppliers. A list of markets are excluded. They are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Korea and the EU market. Some of the arrangements are seen as temporary, for example the exclusion of the EU till 1 May 2018. Nevertheless, meanwhile EU met on a summit together with the UK (22-23 March 2018) what coincided with the introduction of the steel and aluminum protection by the USA.

4. Instead of conclusions: situation in the EU Member States on the background of the world politics

Finally the economy started to grow after the 2008+ crisis. Usually growing economy forms a positive background for deepening the integration. This happened in the past in Europe. Nevertheless, the long period of economic recovery had a strong impact on the moods of people, citizens of the EU and NATO states. This resulted in choices made by electorate in the consecutive elections in Germany, France, the USA, Italy, Hungary and Poland. The explanation of the decisions made during the elections can be simplified to a fact that people do not trust any longer in the repeated remedies, prescriptions how to repair the economy, the policy and the state. When a

politician was giving other remedies than those known from the past, using different wording and communication methods, followed by strong rejection of the traditional approaches known from the past – they had a chance to catch attention of the voters and gain their support.

All this shows that even if a government is formed there is no support for policies from the past. Nevertheless, the realization of opposite oriented policies will not bring expected solutions. This fact is known, however, to a narrow group of analysts, whose arguments seemed not only to be heard but, what seems the worst, not followed by anyone. Those who offer opposite solutions seem to be winning and this means return to populist, nationalist and left oriented policies with more centrist and increase of the state as well as business control approach.

There is also a long list of things which have not been solved in the EU which embrace such problems as corporate governance, privatization of the public utilities, cross-border solutions, recognition of diplomas, compatibility of secondary law, multilateralization of regionalism, connecting internal market with external trade, solving the problem of democratic deficit, political economy of common goods, compatibility of administrative systems, tax systems, new forms of government. Solving the problems should make the internal market more homogenous. Nevertheless, it does not mean that internal market is accomplished in full, although this was seen as the first issues to be solved by the current European Commission. The roadmap of finalizing the process was designed and approved in 2016. Nevertheless, it concentrated on services and banking sector and does not mean that the future of the EU and choice of the scenario for the future was chosen.

Trying to look from a wider angle on the politics it can be seen that a number of states try to demonstrate that they return to protectionism in their economic policy. This can be possible when a politician does not know how strongly their country's economy is intertwined with the world economy. Protection means return of small number of jobs home, but it has also an impact on the level of prices as finally the tariff duties are paid by consumers. All in all, losses are higher than gains. Moreover, restoring jobs in traditional business activities has also an impact on the scale of development, in this particular case being regressive not progressive. Progress means moving jobs to new branches with higher productivity and higher value added.

In general we are aware of positive effects of integration on the rate of growth, wealth of people and growing interdependence among markets and states. How economies are strongly linked internationally and how their rate of growth depends on other markets can be clearly seen within the procedure of Brexit. However, not all get the same message from the same facts. Usually everyone gets the message they want to get. This means that one person will say: "Look even Britain withdraws from the EU, integration, liberalization and globalization". Another will think in what way Britain can compensate the losses caused by the withdrawal from the EU and how long this will last.

The economic and trade policies of the UK and the USA, formerly two powers stimulating liberalization, are in retreat. This can be interpreted as an end of liberalization – a pessimistic scenario. However, it can also be seen as a temporary, transition period in which others will open up. Those others are countries that have difficulties with making such decisions to open their economies, which stops or slows down their development. Such an option can be proved by the Chinese initiative of One Belt One Road, which seems to be a move stimulating opening of the protected economies. Such a scenario can be seen as a balanced vision of the future of international economic relations. There is also an optimistic vision which is constructed on the background that there is a need to slowdown in order to accelerate in the future. People will see what effects they have with the rise of protectionism and in future they will turn to liberalization.

How can we see the scenarios for future Europe in this context? Which of the five scenarios will be chosen? The current situation shows that there is good climate neither for widening nor for deepening of integration. However, what works in favor of liberal solutions globally will also work positively in case of Europe. Nevertheless, Europe integrated militarily also needs a clear picture how the money should be spent from the budget, how big should be the contributions, who is on the list of enlargement and how realistic such membership is, what can be offered instead of membership and to whom, etc. At this point such visions are not heard. Moreover, the preferences of the European Commission in choosing one of the five given scenarios are not known as well as what individual states think about them.

The social and political background for further widening of the EU and deepening of integration seems to be not-supportive. Such a mood can be seen in the majority of states of the EU-27. Such an opinion finds support in case of France, the Netherlands, Poland and Hungary. Partial support for such a policy can be seen in the remaining states, which means that a big share of citizens of the EU are currently against deepening and widening of the EU. This lack of support for further initiatives in the same direction of those which have been bringing positive results for more than half a century in Europe seems to be a big failure of the EU. This is so despite the fact that states and nations became more wealthy, people more educated and healthier. Territory was free from open war-conflicts. Such moods can be seen in more nationalist slogans appearing in states, political divides on the political scene, followed by the demonstration of protectionist measures applied into trade policy in the areas where each country has its own say. All this seems to be a sad and relatively pessimistic picture of the European integration.

The optimistic scenario should be reached with new decisions made by the UK contributing to the EU budget, allowing decisions to deepen the EU integration, embracing some elements of politics, defense and security issues but concentrating mainly on trade liberalization within the EU (accomplishing the internal market) and embracing new free trade agreements externally. Such a scenario can also take into account a specific deal with the UK concerning an access to the internal

market. The decisions in this area can be supported by some pressure of the US over the European politicians. Such pressure can indirectly be seen in the case of the last summit of the EU in March 2018, which was proved by the presence of the UK. This inclusion was achieved as a result of American pressure over the steel and aluminum protection measures. The fact has to be taken into account that the decisions on waving the tariffs put on EU's steel and aluminum exports are temporary, which means that such pressure from the USA can be repeated in the future.

Pessimistic scenario is limiting the process of integration towards a reduced internal market. Such a scenario will lead towards the reduction of coordination and minimalization of common deals of the member states. This will also include obligations towards the general budget and payments from the budget allocated for economic cohesion. This can cause less interest in membership of the third countries.

Realistic scenario means that there will be a multi-speed integration model, in which the integrated politically core will have an impact on some decisions of those who are in outer circles with limited support to political integration. With time passing the mutual ties will be loosened. The core of integrated states can tie-up closer relations which can result in further divides in the EU. This scenario enables the continuation of enlargement by the new member states which will join the outer circles. In such a scenario the ratification of new members can gain approval of all, even those which were against enlargement or even association.

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