@misc{György_Attila_Principal_2011, author={György, Attila and György, Adina Cristina}, year={2011}, rights={Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone (Copyright)}, publisher={Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu}, description={Ekonomia = Economics, 2011, Nr 2 (14), s. 106-113}, language={eng}, abstract={EU budget resources are collected in respect of rules set up by the financial regulation. From EU’s point of view, it is a relatively simple procedure, contributions being based on Member States’ reporting, which is obtained by aggregating data from taxpayers. This mechanism generates a two-level information asymmetry, risk being accounted for by means of agency theory. Thus, we have two different principal – agent relations: European Commission – Member States and Member States – taxpayers. We propose to present the main risks regarding information asymmetry, especially in the relation with New Member States, and evaluate the introduction of an authentic own revenue administered directly by EU institutions}, title={Principal - agent relations in EU budget resource collecting}, type={artykuł}, keywords={agency theory, EU's own resources, information asymmetry}, }