Object structure
Title:

Principal - agent relations in EU budget resource collecting

Group publication title:

Ekonomia XXI Wieku = Economics of the 21st Century

Title in english:

Relacje agent – pryncypał w procesie gromadzenia unijnych środków budżetowych

Creator:

György, Attila ; György, Adina Cristina

Subject and Keywords:

agency theory ; EU's own resources ; information asymmetry

Description:

Ekonomia = Economics, 2011, Nr 2 (14), s. 106-113

Abstrakt:

EU budget resources are collected in respect of rules set up by the financial regulation. From EU’s point of view, it is a relatively simple procedure, contributions being based on Member States’ reporting, which is obtained by aggregating data from taxpayers. This mechanism generates a two-level information asymmetry, risk being accounted for by means of agency theory. Thus, we have two different principal – agent relations: European Commission – Member States and Member States – taxpayers. We propose to present the main risks regarding information asymmetry, especially in the relation with New Member States, and evaluate the introduction of an authentic own revenue administered directly by EU institutions

Publisher:

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu

Place of publication:

Wrocław

Date:

2011

Resource Type:

artykuł

Format:

application/pdf

Language:

eng

Relation:

Ekonomia = Economics, 2011, Nr 2 (14)

Rights:

Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone (Copyright)

Access Rights:

Dla wszystkich w zakresie dozwolonego użytku

Location:

Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu

×

Citation

Citation style: