Object structure

Title:

Loan payment and renegotaiation: the role of the liquidation value

Group publication title:

Argumenta Oeconomica

Creator:

Paliński, Andrzej

Subject and Keywords:

bank loan ; debt ; credit agreement ; interest rate ; liquidation value ; game theory

Description:

Argumenta Oeconomica, 2018, Nr 1 (40), s. 225-252

Abstrakt:

This paper analyzes a model of bank loan repayment as the signalling game. The model shows that under asymmetric information a borrower reaches for renegotiation and debt forgiveness to a greater extent than is required by the return of the venture financed with the loan. In the equilibrium, the borrower pays the lesser of: an amount equal to the liquidation value or the amount of payment specified in the credit agreement. The loan contract induces strategic default and leniency of the bank on the equilibrium path. To offset the impact of the renegotiation options, the interest rate specified in the credit agreement should ex ante take into account the liquidation value of the borrower’s assets. The paper also proposes an example of the utilisation of our theoretical model and the Monte Carlo method to determine the loan interest rate for a commercial loan

Publisher:

Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu

Place of publication:

Wrocław

Date:

2018

Resource Type:

artykuł

Format:

application/pdf

Resource Identifier:

doi:10.15611/aoe.2018.1.10

Language:

eng

Relation:

Argumenta Oeconomica, 2018, Nr 1 (40)

Rights:

Wszystkie prawa zastrzeżone (Copyright)

Access Rights:

Dla wszystkich w zakresie dozwolonego użytku

Location:

Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu